Graham Kendall
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Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

Does AI have a place in the board room?
http://bit.ly/1DXreuW
I am the chair of the MISTA (Multidisciplinary International Conference on Scheduling: Theory and Applications)
http://bit.ly/hvZIaN

Latest Blog Post

Snooker: Celebrating 40 years at the Crucible

Random Blog Post

PATAT 2010: Multi-objective Sports (Football) Scheduling

Publication(s)

Is increased diversity in genetic programming beneficial? An analysis of lineage selection
http://bit.ly/g0zaOT
A Simulated Annealing Enhancement of the Best-Fit Heuristic for the Orthogonal Stock-Cutting Problem
http://bit.ly/fsNXXk
EnHiC: An enforced hill climbing based system for general game playing
http://bit.ly/1VOTCY2
A path-oriented encoding evolutionary algorithm for network coding resource minimization
http://bit.ly/1t0cd2K

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Hingston, P; Dyer, D; Barone, L; French, T and Kendall, G Chapter 7: Opponent Modelling, Evolution, and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma: 20 Years On, pages 139-170, World Scientific, Singapore, Advances in Natural Computation 4, 2007.


Abstract

The game of the iterated prisonerís dilemma (IPD) has been a popular metaphor in explaining cooperative behaviors among selfish individuals. There are several frameworks for which the IPD behavioral interactions can be modelled, depending on the context in question. With the co-evolutionary learning framework, emphasis is placed on studying the conditions of how and why certain IPD behaviors can be learned through a process of adaptation on a strategy representation of behaviors based solely on strategy interactions (i.e., game-play). This framework is different from the classical evolutionary game theory framework that is concerned with frequency dependent reproduction of fixed and predetermined strategies. This review aims at providing a survey of studies on the IPD using the co-evolutionary learning approach. In particular, studies that extended the classical IPD game with two players and two choices are presented.


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Bibtex

@INBOOK{hdbfk2007, chapter = {The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma: 20 Years On},
pages = {139--170},
title = {Chapter 7: Opponent Modelling, Evolution, and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma},
publisher = {World Scientific, Singapore},
year = {2007},
editor = {S. Y. Chong and J. Humble and G. Kendall and J. Li and X. Yao},
author = {P. Hingston and D. Dyer and L. Barone and T. French and G. Kendall},
volume = {4},
number = {3},
series = {Advances in Natural Computation},
abstract = {The game of the iterated prisonerís dilemma (IPD) has been a popular metaphor in explaining cooperative behaviors among selfish individuals. There are several frameworks for which the IPD behavioral interactions can be modelled, depending on the context in question. With the co-evolutionary learning framework, emphasis is placed on studying the conditions of how and why certain IPD behaviors can be learned through a process of adaptation on a strategy representation of behaviors based solely on strategy interactions (i.e., game-play). This framework is different from the classical evolutionary game theory framework that is concerned with frequency dependent reproduction of fixed and predetermined strategies. This review aims at providing a survey of studies on the IPD using the co-evolutionary learning approach. In particular, studies that extended the classical IPD game with two players and two choices are presented.},
keywords = {IPD, Iterated Prisoners; Dilemma, Co-evolution},
owner = {jvb},
timestamp = {2008.09.30},
url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/6461.html} }