Graham Kendall
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Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

I have published a number of papers on Cutting and Packing
http://bit.ly/dQPw7T
Can ants play chess? Yes they can!
http://bit.ly/1yW3UhX

Latest Blog Post

Snooker: Celebrating 40 years at the Crucible

Random Blog Post

Can Artificial Intelligence be used in the Board Room?

Publication(s)

The importance of a piece difference feature to Blondie24
http://bit.ly/1a2Ns0W
A Multiobjective Approach for UK Football Scheduling
http://bit.ly/fV4caa
Using an Evolutionary Algorithm for the Tuning of a Chess Evaluation Function Based on a Dynamic Boundary Strategy
http://bit.ly/hsgyZ8
A learning-guided multi-objective evolutionary algorithm for constrained portfolio optimization
http://bit.ly/1wqQplE

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Hingston, P; Dyer, D; Barone, L; French, T and Kendall, G Chapter 7: Opponent Modelling, Evolution, and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma: 20 Years On, pages 139-170, World Scientific, Singapore, Advances in Natural Computation 4, 2007.


Abstract

The game of the iterated prisonerís dilemma (IPD) has been a popular metaphor in explaining cooperative behaviors among selfish individuals. There are several frameworks for which the IPD behavioral interactions can be modelled, depending on the context in question. With the co-evolutionary learning framework, emphasis is placed on studying the conditions of how and why certain IPD behaviors can be learned through a process of adaptation on a strategy representation of behaviors based solely on strategy interactions (i.e., game-play). This framework is different from the classical evolutionary game theory framework that is concerned with frequency dependent reproduction of fixed and predetermined strategies. This review aims at providing a survey of studies on the IPD using the co-evolutionary learning approach. In particular, studies that extended the classical IPD game with two players and two choices are presented.


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URL

The URL for additional information is http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/6461.html

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Bibtex

@INBOOK{hdbfk2007, chapter = {The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma: 20 Years On},
pages = {139--170},
title = {Chapter 7: Opponent Modelling, Evolution, and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma},
publisher = {World Scientific, Singapore},
year = {2007},
editor = {S. Y. Chong and J. Humble and G. Kendall and J. Li and X. Yao},
author = {P. Hingston and D. Dyer and L. Barone and T. French and G. Kendall},
volume = {4},
number = {3},
series = {Advances in Natural Computation},
abstract = {The game of the iterated prisonerís dilemma (IPD) has been a popular metaphor in explaining cooperative behaviors among selfish individuals. There are several frameworks for which the IPD behavioral interactions can be modelled, depending on the context in question. With the co-evolutionary learning framework, emphasis is placed on studying the conditions of how and why certain IPD behaviors can be learned through a process of adaptation on a strategy representation of behaviors based solely on strategy interactions (i.e., game-play). This framework is different from the classical evolutionary game theory framework that is concerned with frequency dependent reproduction of fixed and predetermined strategies. This review aims at providing a survey of studies on the IPD using the co-evolutionary learning approach. In particular, studies that extended the classical IPD game with two players and two choices are presented.},
keywords = {IPD, Iterated Prisoners; Dilemma, Co-evolution},
owner = {jvb},
timestamp = {2008.09.30},
url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/6461.html} }