Graham Kendall
Various Images

Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

I am involved with a spin out company that specialises in Strategic Resource Planning
http://bit.ly/eTPZO2
A Conversation article celebrating Pi
http://bit.ly/1DXuXbV

Latest Blog Post

How Isaac Newton could help you beat the casino at roulette

Random Blog Post

Google Scholar

Publication(s)

A scheme for determining vehicle routes based on Arc-based service network design
http://bit.ly/2iaUTxA
An Investigation of an Adaptive Scheduling for Multi Headed Placement Machines Using a Greedy Search
http://bit.ly/g0DYmz
The Scalability of Evolved On Line Bin Packing Heuristics
http://bit.ly/eVBJTd
On Nie-Tan operator and type-reduction of interval type-2 fuzzy sets
http://bit.ly/2kqxtD3

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Li, J and Kendall, G Collective Behavior and Kin Selection in Evolutionary IPD. Journal of Multiple-Valued Logic and Soft Computing, 16 (6): 509-525, 2010.


Abstract

Some strategies can be evolutionarily stronger than others although no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in iterated prisonerís dilemma if the long-term payoff for each player is not insignificant. Li and Kendall (2009) introduced a so-called collective strategy for evolutionary iterated prisonerís dilemma which plays a sequence of predefined moves and then identifies the opponent according to the response. It only cooperates with kin members and defects against any other strategies. Agroup of collective strategies is especially strong in evolution. In this paper, we study a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities to the collective strategy and the strategy that always defects. A population of mixed strategies has the advantage of expelling fake kin members so that other strategies do not have the chance to indirectly invade. Simulations show that it is evolutionarily strong in maintaining a homogeneous population. Kin selection favors collective behavior among group members which is not necessarily cooperation.We find that defection can also be a kin altruism and there is qualitative benefit as well as quantitative benefit from the altruistic behaviors.


pdf

There is no pdf available for this paper. You might like to try to obtain the original source (see the doi, for example)


doi

This publication does not have a doi, so we cannot provide a link to the original source

What is a doi?: A doi (Document Object Identifier) is a unique identifier for sicientific papers (and occasionally other material). This provides direct access to the location where the original article is published using the URL http://dx.doi/org/xxxx (replacing xxx with the doi). See http://dx.doi.org/ for more information


Journal Rankings


ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports

The Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports (often known as ISI Impact Factors) help measure how often an article is cited. You can get an introduction to Journal Citation Reports here. Below I have provided the ISI impact factor for the jourrnal in which this article was published. For complete information I have shown the ISI ranking over a number of years, with the latest ranking highlighted.

2014 (0.346), 2013 (0.667), 2012 (1.047), 2011 (0.260), 2010 (0.333), 2009 (0.343), 2008 (0.308), 2007 (0.407), 2006 (0.200)

URL

This pubication does not have a URL associated with it.

The URL is only provided if there is additional information that might be useful. For example, where the entry is a book chapter, the URL might link to the book itself.


Bibtex

@ARTICLE{lk2010, author = {J. Li and G. Kendall},
title = {Collective Behavior and Kin Selection in Evolutionary IPD},
journal = {Journal of Multiple-Valued Logic and Soft Computing},
year = {2010},
volume = {16},
pages = {509--525},
number = {6},
abstract = {Some strategies can be evolutionarily stronger than others although no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in iterated prisonerís dilemma if the long-term payoff for each player is not insignificant. Li and Kendall (2009) introduced a so-called collective strategy for evolutionary iterated prisonerís dilemma which plays a sequence of predefined moves and then identifies the opponent according to the response. It only cooperates with kin members and defects against any other strategies. Agroup of collective strategies is especially strong in evolution. In this paper, we study a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities to the collective strategy and the strategy that always defects. A population of mixed strategies has the advantage of expelling fake kin members so that other strategies do not have the chance to indirectly invade. Simulations show that it is evolutionarily strong in maintaining a homogeneous population. Kin selection favors collective behavior among group members which is not necessarily cooperation.We find that defection can also be a kin altruism and there is qualitative benefit as well as quantitative benefit from the altruistic behaviors.},
issn = {1542-3980},
keywords = {Iterated Prisoners Dilemma, behavior, evolution, evolutionary, collective},
owner = {gxk},
timestamp = {2010.10.12} }