Graham Kendall
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Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

I have published a few papers on Sports Scheduling.
http://bit.ly/gVaUqT
Does AI have a place in the board room?
http://bit.ly/1DXreuW

Latest Blog Post

Snooker: Celebrating 40 years at the Crucible

Random Blog Post

Football Fixture Scheduling: Are all clashes equal?

Publication(s)

Chapter 1: Introduction
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The Importance of Look-Ahead Depth in Evolutionary Checkers
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A Hybrid Evolutionary Approach to the Nurse Rostering Problem
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Backward Induction and Repeated Games With Strategy Constraints: An Inspiration From the Surprise Exam Paradox
RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Li, J and Kendall, G Collective Behavior and Kin Selection in Evolutionary IPD. Journal of Multiple-Valued Logic and Soft Computing, 16 (6): 509-525, 2010.


Abstract

Some strategies can be evolutionarily stronger than others although no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in iterated prisonerís dilemma if the long-term payoff for each player is not insignificant. Li and Kendall (2009) introduced a so-called collective strategy for evolutionary iterated prisonerís dilemma which plays a sequence of predefined moves and then identifies the opponent according to the response. It only cooperates with kin members and defects against any other strategies. Agroup of collective strategies is especially strong in evolution. In this paper, we study a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities to the collective strategy and the strategy that always defects. A population of mixed strategies has the advantage of expelling fake kin members so that other strategies do not have the chance to indirectly invade. Simulations show that it is evolutionarily strong in maintaining a homogeneous population. Kin selection favors collective behavior among group members which is not necessarily cooperation.We find that defection can also be a kin altruism and there is qualitative benefit as well as quantitative benefit from the altruistic behaviors.


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Journal Rankings


ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports

The Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports (often known as ISI Impact Factors) help measure how often an article is cited. You can get an introduction to Journal Citation Reports here. Below I have provided the ISI impact factor for the jourrnal in which this article was published. For complete information I have shown the ISI ranking over a number of years, with the latest ranking highlighted.

2014 (0.346), 2013 (0.667), 2012 (1.047), 2011 (0.260), 2010 (0.333), 2009 (0.343), 2008 (0.308), 2007 (0.407), 2006 (0.200)

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Bibtex

@ARTICLE{lk2010, author = {J. Li and G. Kendall},
title = {Collective Behavior and Kin Selection in Evolutionary IPD},
journal = {Journal of Multiple-Valued Logic and Soft Computing},
year = {2010},
volume = {16},
pages = {509--525},
number = {6},
abstract = {Some strategies can be evolutionarily stronger than others although no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in iterated prisonerís dilemma if the long-term payoff for each player is not insignificant. Li and Kendall (2009) introduced a so-called collective strategy for evolutionary iterated prisonerís dilemma which plays a sequence of predefined moves and then identifies the opponent according to the response. It only cooperates with kin members and defects against any other strategies. Agroup of collective strategies is especially strong in evolution. In this paper, we study a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities to the collective strategy and the strategy that always defects. A population of mixed strategies has the advantage of expelling fake kin members so that other strategies do not have the chance to indirectly invade. Simulations show that it is evolutionarily strong in maintaining a homogeneous population. Kin selection favors collective behavior among group members which is not necessarily cooperation.We find that defection can also be a kin altruism and there is qualitative benefit as well as quantitative benefit from the altruistic behaviors.},
issn = {1542-3980},
keywords = {Iterated Prisoners Dilemma, behavior, evolution, evolutionary, collective},
owner = {gxk},
timestamp = {2010.10.12} }