Graham Kendall
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Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

The hunt for MH370
http://bit.ly/1DXRLbu
If you are interested in hyper-heuristics, take a look at my publications in this area
http://bit.ly/efxLGg

Latest Blog Post

How Isaac Newton could help you beat the casino at roulette

Random Blog Post

Why do researchers not read the aims and scope of a journal?

Publication(s)

Multi-method algorithms: Investigating the entity-to-algorithm allocation problem
http://bit.ly/1goMj5g
A hyper-heuristic approach to sequencing by hybridization of DNA sequences
http://bit.ly/1mlNjL6
A Multi-objective Hyper-heuristic based on Choice Function
http://bit.ly/1f8GQgU
Youth Sports Leagues Scheduling
http://bit.ly/f1i7SE

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Li, J and Kendall, G Finite iterated prisoner's dilemma revisited: belief change and end-game effect. In Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions (BOGT'10), pages 1-5, ACM New York, NY, USA, 2010.


Abstract

We develop a novel Bayesian model for the finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma that takes into consideration belief change and end-game effect. According to this model, mutual defection is always the Nash equilibrium at any stage of the game, but it is not the only Nash equilibrium under some conditions. The conditions for mutual cooperation to be Nash equilibrium are deduced. It reveals that cooperation can be achieved if both players believe that their opponents are likely to cooperate not only at the current stage but also in future stages. End-game effect cannot be backward induced in repeated games with uncertainty. We illustrate this by analyzing the unexpected hanging paradox.


pdf

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doi

The doi for this publication is 10.1145/1807406.1807454 You can link directly to the original paper, via the doi, from here

What is a doi?: A doi (Document Object Identifier) is a unique identifier for sicientific papers (and occasionally other material). This provides direct access to the location where the original article is published using the URL http://dx.doi/org/xxxx (replacing xxx with the doi). See http://dx.doi.org/ for more information



URL

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Bibtex

@INPROCEEDINGS{lk2010a, author = {J. Li and G. Kendall},
title = {Finite iterated prisoner's dilemma revisited: belief change and end-game effect},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions (BOGT'10)},
year = {2010},
editor = {M. Dror and G. Sosic},
pages = {1--5},
month = {14-16 May 2010,},
organization = {Newport Beach, California},
publisher = {ACM New York, NY, USA},
abstract = {We develop a novel Bayesian model for the finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma that takes into consideration belief change and end-game effect. According to this model, mutual defection is always the Nash equilibrium at any stage of the game, but it is not the only Nash equilibrium under some conditions. The conditions for mutual cooperation to be Nash equilibrium are deduced. It reveals that cooperation can be achieved if both players believe that their opponents are likely to cooperate not only at the current stage but also in future stages. End-game effect cannot be backward induced in repeated games with uncertainty. We illustrate this by analyzing the unexpected hanging paradox.},
doi = {10.1145/1807406.1807454},
keywords = {prisoners dilemma, iterated prisoners dilemma, cooperation, Nash equilibrium, hanging paradox},
owner = {gxk},
timestamp = {2010.12.11},
webpdf = {http://www.graham-kendall.com/papers/lk2010a.pdf} }