Graham Kendall
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Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

Can ants play chess? Yes they can!
http://bit.ly/1yW3UhX
Does AI have a place in the board room?
http://bit.ly/1DXreuW

Latest Blog Post

Snooker: Celebrating 40 years at the Crucible

Random Blog Post

Bibtax parser: Mashup no more

Publication(s)

Regulators as Ďagentsí: power and personality in risk regulation and a role for agent-based simulation
http://bit.ly/evaXWn
Scheduling TV Commercials: Models and Solution Methodologies
http://bit.ly/idSBCA
Hyperheuristics: A Robust Optimisation Method Applied to Nurse Scheduling
http://bit.ly/h17mwh
Multi-method algorithms: Investigating the entity-to-algorithm allocation problem
http://bit.ly/1goMj5g

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Li, J and Kendall, G Finite iterated prisoner's dilemma revisited: belief change and end-game effect. In Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions (BOGT'10), pages 1-5, ACM New York, NY, USA, 2010.


Abstract

We develop a novel Bayesian model for the finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma that takes into consideration belief change and end-game effect. According to this model, mutual defection is always the Nash equilibrium at any stage of the game, but it is not the only Nash equilibrium under some conditions. The conditions for mutual cooperation to be Nash equilibrium are deduced. It reveals that cooperation can be achieved if both players believe that their opponents are likely to cooperate not only at the current stage but also in future stages. End-game effect cannot be backward induced in repeated games with uncertainty. We illustrate this by analyzing the unexpected hanging paradox.


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doi

The doi for this publication is 10.1145/1807406.1807454 You can link directly to the original paper, via the doi, from here

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Bibtex

@INPROCEEDINGS{lk2010a, author = {J. Li and G. Kendall},
title = {Finite iterated prisoner's dilemma revisited: belief change and end-game effect},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions (BOGT'10)},
year = {2010},
editor = {M. Dror and G. Sosic},
pages = {1--5},
month = {14-16 May 2010,},
organization = {Newport Beach, California},
publisher = {ACM New York, NY, USA},
abstract = {We develop a novel Bayesian model for the finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma that takes into consideration belief change and end-game effect. According to this model, mutual defection is always the Nash equilibrium at any stage of the game, but it is not the only Nash equilibrium under some conditions. The conditions for mutual cooperation to be Nash equilibrium are deduced. It reveals that cooperation can be achieved if both players believe that their opponents are likely to cooperate not only at the current stage but also in future stages. End-game effect cannot be backward induced in repeated games with uncertainty. We illustrate this by analyzing the unexpected hanging paradox.},
doi = {10.1145/1807406.1807454},
keywords = {prisoners dilemma, iterated prisoners dilemma, cooperation, Nash equilibrium, hanging paradox},
owner = {gxk},
timestamp = {2010.12.11},
webpdf = {http://www.graham-kendall.com/papers/lk2010a.pdf} }