Graham Kendall
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Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

I blog occasionally, feel free to take a look.
http://bit.ly/hq6rMK
Help solve Santa's logistics problems
http://bit.ly/1DXreuW

Latest Blog Post

Snooker: Celebrating 40 years at the Crucible

Random Blog Post

Knight’s Tour

Publication(s)

Automated code generation by local search
http://bit.ly/1dAz69a
Studying the Effect that a Linear Transformation has on the Time-Series Prediction Ability of an Evolutionary Neural Network
http://bit.ly/eyLaq2
Scheduling English Football Fixtures: Consideration of Two Conflicting Objectives
http://bit.ly/er0RSP
Enumerating knight's tours using an ant colony algorithm
http://bit.ly/fMCY7C

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Li, J and Kendall, G Evolutionary Stability of Discriminating Behaviors With the Presence of Kin Cheaters. IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 43 (6): 2044-2053, 2013.

This journal was formerly IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part B: Cybernetics (see the announcement)


Abstract

Discriminating altruism, particularly kin altruism, is a fundamental mechanism of cooperation in nature. Altruistic behavior is not favored by evolution in the circumstances where there are “kin cheaters” that cannot be effectively identified. Using evolutionary iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we deduce the condition for discriminating strategies to be evolutionarily stable and show that the competition between groups of different discriminating strategies restrains the percentage of kin cheaters. A discriminating strategy (DS) manages to cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kins by using an identification mechanism that includes a predetermined sequence of cooperation and defection. The opponent is identified as a kin member if it plays the same sequence. Otherwise, it is identified as non-kin, and defection will be triggered. Once the DS forms the majority of the population, any strategy that does not play the same sequence of moves will be expelled. We find that the competition between a variety of discriminating strategies favors a stable rate of cooperation and a low frequency of kin cheaters.


pdf

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doi

The doi for this publication is 10.1109/TCYB.2013.2239986 You can link directly to the original paper, via the doi, from here

What is a doi?: A doi (Document Object Identifier) is a unique identifier for sicientific papers (and occasionally other material). This provides direct access to the location where the original article is published using the URL http://dx.doi/org/xxxx (replacing xxx with the doi). See http://dx.doi.org/ for more information


Journal Rankings


ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports

The Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports (often known as ISI Impact Factors) help measure how often an article is cited. You can get an introduction to Journal Citation Reports here. Below I have provided the ISI impact factor for the jourrnal in which this article was published. For complete information I have shown the ISI ranking over a number of years, with the latest ranking highlighted.

2014 (3.469)

URL

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Bibtex

@ARTICLE{lk2013a, author = {J. Li and G. Kendall},
title = {Evolutionary Stability of Discriminating Behaviors With the Presence of Kin Cheaters},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics},
year = {2013},
volume = {43},
pages = {2044--2053},
number = {6},
note = {This journal was formerly IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part B: Cybernetics (see the announcement)},
abstract = {Discriminating altruism, particularly kin altruism, is a fundamental mechanism of cooperation in nature. Altruistic behavior is not favored by evolution in the circumstances where there are “kin cheaters” that cannot be effectively identified. Using evolutionary iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we deduce the condition for discriminating strategies to be evolutionarily stable and show that the competition between groups of different discriminating strategies restrains the percentage of kin cheaters. A discriminating strategy (DS) manages to cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kins by using an identification mechanism that includes a predetermined sequence of cooperation and defection. The opponent is identified as a kin member if it plays the same sequence. Otherwise, it is identified as non-kin, and defection will be triggered. Once the DS forms the majority of the population, any strategy that does not play the same sequence of moves will be expelled. We find that the competition between a variety of discriminating strategies favors a stable rate of cooperation and a low frequency of kin cheaters.},
doi = {10.1109/TCYB.2013.2239986},
issn = {2168-2267},
owner = {Graham},
timestamp = {2013.10.12},
webpdf = {http://www.graham-kendall.com/papers/lk2013a.pdf} }