Graham Kendall
Various Images

Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

Does AI have a place in the board room?
http://bit.ly/1DXreuW
I have wriiten a number of articles for TheConversation
http://bit.ly/1yWlOkE

Latest Blog Post

How Isaac Newton could help you beat the casino at roulette

Random Blog Post

Tracking Paper Downloads for MISTA

Publication(s)

Does money matter in inflation forecasting?
http://bit.ly/fRebpX
Evolving Tiles for Automated Self-Assembly Design
http://bit.ly/dInbHL
Evolutionary Computation in the Real World: Successes and Challenges
http://bit.ly/1tT0uEY
Co-evolution of Successful Trading Strategies in A Simulated Stock Market
http://bit.ly/eAkoXn

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Li, J and Kendall, G Evolutionary Stability of Discriminating Behaviors With the Presence of Kin Cheaters. IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 43 (6): 2044-2053, 2013.

This journal was formerly IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part B: Cybernetics (see the announcement)


Abstract

Discriminating altruism, particularly kin altruism, is a fundamental mechanism of cooperation in nature. Altruistic behavior is not favored by evolution in the circumstances where there are “kin cheaters” that cannot be effectively identified. Using evolutionary iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we deduce the condition for discriminating strategies to be evolutionarily stable and show that the competition between groups of different discriminating strategies restrains the percentage of kin cheaters. A discriminating strategy (DS) manages to cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kins by using an identification mechanism that includes a predetermined sequence of cooperation and defection. The opponent is identified as a kin member if it plays the same sequence. Otherwise, it is identified as non-kin, and defection will be triggered. Once the DS forms the majority of the population, any strategy that does not play the same sequence of moves will be expelled. We find that the competition between a variety of discriminating strategies favors a stable rate of cooperation and a low frequency of kin cheaters.


pdf

You can download the pdf of this publication from here


doi

The doi for this publication is 10.1109/TCYB.2013.2239986 You can link directly to the original paper, via the doi, from here

What is a doi?: A doi (Document Object Identifier) is a unique identifier for sicientific papers (and occasionally other material). This provides direct access to the location where the original article is published using the URL http://dx.doi/org/xxxx (replacing xxx with the doi). See http://dx.doi.org/ for more information


Journal Rankings


ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports

The Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports (often known as ISI Impact Factors) help measure how often an article is cited. You can get an introduction to Journal Citation Reports here. Below I have provided the ISI impact factor for the jourrnal in which this article was published. For complete information I have shown the ISI ranking over a number of years, with the latest ranking highlighted.

2014 (3.469)

URL

This pubication does not have a URL associated with it.

The URL is only provided if there is additional information that might be useful. For example, where the entry is a book chapter, the URL might link to the book itself.


Bibtex

@ARTICLE{lk2013a, author = {J. Li and G. Kendall},
title = {Evolutionary Stability of Discriminating Behaviors With the Presence of Kin Cheaters},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics},
year = {2013},
volume = {43},
pages = {2044--2053},
number = {6},
note = {This journal was formerly IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part B: Cybernetics (see the announcement)},
abstract = {Discriminating altruism, particularly kin altruism, is a fundamental mechanism of cooperation in nature. Altruistic behavior is not favored by evolution in the circumstances where there are “kin cheaters” that cannot be effectively identified. Using evolutionary iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we deduce the condition for discriminating strategies to be evolutionarily stable and show that the competition between groups of different discriminating strategies restrains the percentage of kin cheaters. A discriminating strategy (DS) manages to cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kins by using an identification mechanism that includes a predetermined sequence of cooperation and defection. The opponent is identified as a kin member if it plays the same sequence. Otherwise, it is identified as non-kin, and defection will be triggered. Once the DS forms the majority of the population, any strategy that does not play the same sequence of moves will be expelled. We find that the competition between a variety of discriminating strategies favors a stable rate of cooperation and a low frequency of kin cheaters.},
doi = {10.1109/TCYB.2013.2239986},
issn = {2168-2267},
owner = {Graham},
timestamp = {2013.10.12},
webpdf = {http://www.graham-kendall.com/papers/lk2013a.pdf} }