Graham Kendall
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Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

How are football fixtures worked out?
http://bit.ly/1z0oTAH
I blog occasionally, feel free to take a look.
http://bit.ly/hq6rMK

Latest Blog Post

Snooker: Celebrating 40 years at the Crucible

Random Blog Post

Videos on the basics of Java

Publication(s)

Ghost direction detection and other innovations for Ms. Pac-Man
http://bit.ly/hRqET5
Optimisation for Surface Mount Placement Machines
http://bit.ly/fbcxGc
Evolutionary Computation in the Real World: Successes and Challenges
http://bit.ly/1tT0uEY
Regulators as agents: Modelling personality and power as evidence is brokered to support decisions on environmental risk
http://bit.ly/1bh6em7

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Li, J and Kendall, G On Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states that are not characterised by the folk theorem. PLoS ONE, 10 (8): e0136032, 2015.

ISSN: 1932-6203


Abstract

In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for non-cooperative games, defines all Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games. Here, we prove that Nash equilibria that are not characterised by the folk theorem do exist. By adopting specific reactive strategies, a group of players can be better off by coordinating their actions in repeated games. We call it a type-k equilibrium when a group of k players coordinate their actions and they have no incentive to deviate from their strategies simultaneously. The existence and stability of the type-k equilibrium in general games is discussed. This study shows that the sets of Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable states have greater cardinality than classic game theory has predicted in many repeated games.


pdf

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doi

The doi for this publication is 10.1371/journal.pone.0136032 You can link directly to the original paper, via the doi, from here

What is a doi?: A doi (Document Object Identifier) is a unique identifier for sicientific papers (and occasionally other material). This provides direct access to the location where the original article is published using the URL http://dx.doi/org/xxxx (replacing xxx with the doi). See http://dx.doi.org/ for more information


Journal Rankings


ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports

The Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports (often known as ISI Impact Factors) help measure how often an article is cited. You can get an introduction to Journal Citation Reports here. Below I have provided the ISI impact factor for the jourrnal in which this article was published. For complete information I have shown the ISI ranking over a number of years, with the latest ranking highlighted.

2014 (3.234), 2013 (3.534), 2012 (3.730), 2011 (4.092), 2010 (4.411), 2009 (4.351)

URL

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The URL is only provided if there is additional information that might be useful. For example, where the entry is a book chapter, the URL might link to the book itself.


Bibtex

@ARTICLE{lk2015, author = {J. Li and G. Kendall},
title = {On Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states that are not characterised by the folk theorem},
journal = {PLoS ONE},
year = {2015},
volume = {10},
pages = {e0136032},
number = {8},
note = {ISSN: 1932-6203},
abstract = {In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for non-cooperative games, defines all Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games. Here, we prove that Nash equilibria that are not characterised by the folk theorem do exist. By adopting specific reactive strategies, a group of players can be better off by coordinating their actions in repeated games. We call it a type-k equilibrium when a group of k players coordinate their actions and they have no incentive to deviate from their strategies simultaneously. The existence and stability of the type-k equilibrium in general games is discussed. This study shows that the sets of Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable states have greater cardinality than classic game theory has predicted in many repeated games.},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0136032},
issn = {1932-6203},
owner = {gxk},
timestamp = {2011.06.11},
webpdf = {http://www.graham-kendall.com/papers/lk2015.pdf} }