Graham Kendall
Various Images

Professor Graham Kendall

Professor Graham Kendall is the Provost and CEO of The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC). He is also a Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Nottingham.

He is a Director of MyResearch Sdn Bhd, Crops for the Future Sdn Bhd. and Nottingham Green Technologies Sdn Bhd. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society (FBCS) and a Fellow of the Operational Research Society (FORS).

He has published over 230 peer reviewed papers. He is an Associate Editor of 10 journals and the Editor-in-Chief of the IEEE Transactions of Computational Intelligence and AI in Games.

News

How are university examinations scheduled?
http://bit.ly/1z0pG4s
Can ants play chess? Yes they can!
http://bit.ly/1yW3UhX

Latest Blog Post

How Isaac Newton could help you beat the casino at roulette

Random Blog Post

Model Formulation: Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP)

Publication(s)

An improved constraint satisfaction adaptive neural network for job-shop scheduling
http://bit.ly/h2v47z
Detecting change and dealing with uncertainty in imperfect evolutionary environments
http://bit.ly/1zSwgTX
Advanced Population Diversity Measures in Genetic Progaramming
http://bit.ly/i8Yh1C
Introducing a round robin tournament into Blondie24
http://bit.ly/f4DBrz

Graham Kendall: Details of Requested Publication


Citation

Li, J; Kendall, G and Vasilakos, A. V Backward Induction and Repeated Games With Strategy Constraints: An Inspiration From the Surprise Exam Paradox. IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games, 5 (3): 242-250, 2013.


Abstract

Backward induction has led to some controversy in specific games, the surprise exam paradox and iterated prisoner’s dilemma for example, despite its wide use in solving finitely repeated games with complete information. In this paper, a typical misuse of backward induction is revealed by analyzing the surprise exam paradox, and the reason why backward induction may fail is investigated. The surprise exam paradox represents a set of repeated games with strategy constraints and has not been fully investigated in game theory. The agents in real-world activities always face constraints in decision making, for example, a budget limitation. In a repeated game with strategy constraints, the players’ choices in different stages are not independent and later choices depend on previous choices because of the strategy constraints. Backward induction cannot be applied in its normal use and it needs to be combined with Bayes’ theorem in solving these kinds of problems.We also investigate how the strategy constraints influence the equilibrium and show how to solve repeated games with strategy constraints by analyzing a repeated battle of the sexes game with a budget constraint.


pdf

You can download the pdf of this publication from here


doi

The doi for this publication is 10.1109/TCIAIG.2013.2261894 You can link directly to the original paper, via the doi, from here

What is a doi?: A doi (Document Object Identifier) is a unique identifier for sicientific papers (and occasionally other material). This provides direct access to the location where the original article is published using the URL http://dx.doi/org/xxxx (replacing xxx with the doi). See http://dx.doi.org/ for more information


Journal Rankings


ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports

The Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports (often known as ISI Impact Factors) help measure how often an article is cited. You can get an introduction to Journal Citation Reports here. Below I have provided the ISI impact factor for the jourrnal in which this article was published. For complete information I have shown the ISI ranking over a number of years, with the latest ranking highlighted.

2014 (1.481), 2013 (1.167), 2012 (1.694), 2011 (1.617)

URL

This pubication does not have a URL associated with it.

The URL is only provided if there is additional information that might be useful. For example, where the entry is a book chapter, the URL might link to the book itself.


Bibtex

@ARTICLE{lkv2013, author = {J. Li and G. Kendall and A. V. Vasilakos},
title = {Backward Induction and Repeated Games With Strategy Constraints: An Inspiration From the Surprise Exam Paradox},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games},
year = {2013},
volume = {5},
pages = {242--250},
number = {3},
abstract = {Backward induction has led to some controversy in specific games, the surprise exam paradox and iterated prisoner’s dilemma for example, despite its wide use in solving finitely repeated games with complete information. In this paper, a typical misuse of backward induction is revealed by analyzing the surprise exam paradox, and the reason why backward induction may fail is investigated. The surprise exam paradox represents a set of repeated games with strategy constraints and has not been fully investigated in game theory. The agents in real-world activities always face constraints in decision making, for example, a budget limitation. In a repeated game with strategy constraints, the players’ choices in different stages are not independent and later choices depend on previous choices because of the strategy constraints. Backward induction cannot be applied in its normal use and it needs to be combined with Bayes’ theorem in solving these kinds of problems.We also investigate how the strategy constraints influence the equilibrium and show how to solve repeated games with strategy constraints by analyzing a repeated battle of the sexes game with a budget constraint.},
doi = {10.1109/TCIAIG.2013.2261894},
issn = {1943-068X},
owner = {Graham},
timestamp = {2013.10.12},
webpdf = {http://www.graham-kendall.com/papers/lkv2013.pdf} }